The Irish language issue and Brexit continue to block Stormont’s restoration – they may not be resolved for some time
6 min read
The deadline for Westminster legislation on abortion and same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland is fast approaching. Meanwhile Stormont remains in deadlock with an ongoing dispute over the Irish language. But is any return to power-sharing now wholly dependent on a successfully-worded Brexit compromise? Crossbench peer Lord Bew reports
In the early part of this year, many of the senior players in Northern Irish politics were reasonably confident that devolution would return later this year or early next. The Brexit impasse has, however, thus far served to stymie such hopes. Yet it is not difficult to see why there was a reasonable degree of optimism.
Sinn Féin, the only party which is holding out against a return of Stormont, has not really prospered at the polls. Some of their electors see the Irish language as a rather abstract issue. The current internal electoral contest over the post of vice-president is a sign of unease – it is also a welcome sign of a normalisation of that party’s internal life. The militaristic elite is still there but the very fact of an open contest for votes reduces the role of the ageing warlords. The Irish language issue, now the most divisive issue between Sinn Féin and the DUP, may have to wait for the aftermath of a general election before it is solved. That said, the DUP came close to a deal on this point in the past and therefore an eventual deal cannot be ruled out. The clue here is for everyone to learn from the lessons of the Irish past. The Irish language is a beautiful language and its use threatens no one. However every serious Irish language scholar and enthusiast recognises that in the twentieth century it was used as a political weapon at the expense of a genuine popular language revival – one of the signal failures of the Irish state. The need now is to place those who genuinely love the Irish language – as opposed to using it to irritate the Unionists – at the forefront of new developments.
But of course, there is the unresolved issue of Brexit. The prospects of a return to devolution in Northern Ireland are dependent on a successful Brexit compromise between the EU and the UK. At the time of writing it appears that the EU – whilst openly acknowledging the ‘positive’ compromise by the UK – is unlikely to agree a new deal with the UK. In the absence of this, or any other compromise, the likelihood is one of intensified polarisation – a polarisation which is likely to be expressed in and beyond the next general election. The advantage of the new proposal is that it had in theory automatic DUP buy in and, if agreed with the EU and Dublin, automatic nationalist buy in. But this pleasant thought has begun to evaporate – worse still, the EU’s reaction has raised serious issues about its good faith. The British document moved decisively to meet EU concerns on the hard border, protection of north-south trade and the single market. The Withdrawal Agreement and other EU documents spoke often of protection of the Good Friday Agreement but it is notable that most recent EU statements make no mention of protecting the Good Friday Agreement. It seems that the EU sees no need to compromise any of the gains it made so easily in the early stages of the negotiation.
But the decreased reference to the Good Friday agreement is interesting. Does it signal a tacit EU awareness of the reality that many of its proposed policies would not strengthen that agreement? On the other hand, it must be admitted that nationalist Ireland sees the new proposal as embodying an unacceptable DUP veto.
The debate has become ever more shrill. Very few in the Irish media have any real command of the detail but they have full command of the ideology. Northern Ireland’s recent debates on equal marriage and abortion are being settled by the action of external forces in the UK Parliament or the judiciary. In theory at least, Westminster could also produce a moderate Irish language Act. But without a Brexit compromise, Stormont seems likely to remain empty for a while yet.
But it would be tragic if the new proposal fell because of an alleged DUP veto four years down the road. As Newton Emerson has pointed out this is based on a misunderstanding of assembly rules. In any case, a time limit might serve the same function and allow the EU to cash the elements in the new British position which it has acknowledged as new and positive.
The clue to any deal either locally or internationally lies in paragraph 50 of the joint agreement of December 2017 between the UK and the EU:
In the absence of agreed solutions, as set out in the previous paragraph, the United Kingdom will ensure that no new regulatory barriers develop between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, unless, consistent with the 1998 Agreement, the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly agree that distinct arrangements are appropriate for Northern Ireland. In all circumstances, the United Kingdom will continue to ensure the same unfettered access for Northern Ireland’s businesses to the whole of the United Kingdom internal market
The DUP’s recent compromise is based on this paragraph and the only way of progress is by retaining respect for this this language.
At this point all observers appear to agree that the return of Stormont requires both a general election and a Brexit solution.
The possibility that the socially conservative Catholics and Protestants could generate enough pressure to bring about a return to power-sharing – and thus preventing the intervention of Westminster on social issues such as equal marriage and abortion – is fast receding.
But in the end it must be recalled that the Northern Ireland political class as whole has no real alternative to the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement and therefore there must yet be a good hope that these intuitions will return in 2020.
It is striking that even when these institutions are down, the Good Friday Agreement template ensures that both communities feel secure that they will not be dominated by the other. Even when down and not working properly the Good Friday Agreement still has a stabilising effect.
Unfortunately the EU’s current plan involves a disruption of strands two and three of the Good Friday Agreement. On March 12 in Parliament, the Attorney General and Brexit Secretary made it clear that the UK government would steadfastly resist such an outcome. Such a mitigation of the backstop should still be part of any way forward.
Professor the Lord Bew is a crossbench peer, ennobled in recognition of his contribution to the Northern Ireland peace process
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