What can we expect from Trump's foreign policy 2.0?
Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead
Donald Trump’s return to the White House brings with it an “America First” foreign policy, prioritising self-reliance, tariffs, and reduced global commitments. What challenges does this pose for the UK and global stability amid rising geopolitical tensions?
There’s only one story this week. Trump is back in the White House.
After the pageantry of today’s inauguration, attention will turn to policy. What do President Trump, a businessman who has vowed to end American involvement in conflict overseas and pursue “peace through strength”, and Vice President JD Vance, an Iraq war veteran with isolationist tendencies, have in store for foreign policy, and what does this mean for the health of the transatlantic relationship?
While domestically the economy, the health of democracy, national security, Supreme Court appointments, and immigration topped US voters’ concerns, and although he has only been out of power for four years, the 45th, and soon to be 47th, President inherits a very different world. The West is facing its most volatile geopolitical challenges since the Cold War, with a more competitive and aggressive China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to contend with, as well as “problems without passports” such as climate change, pandemics and migration threatening peace, stability and prosperity, and having a significant impact on voter behaviour and trust.
In order to tackle these issues the UK needs the support of our closest allies. But what if that ally is increasingly isolationist?
Following the “America First” policy, during his first Administration, Trump oversaw continued withdrawal of US troops from foreign countries, withdrew from the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Iran Nuclear Deal in which Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. He also brokered the Abraham Accords which were hoped to advance the two-state solution by opening channels of communications between the Arab states of the Gulf and Israel, moved the American Embassy to Jerusalem, acknowledged Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and became the first sitting US president to set foot in North Korea. Quite an extensive list of interventions for someone who vowed to stay out of foreign affairs.
Amid the theatrics surrounding recent foreign policy announcements such as seeking territorial expansion into Canada, Greenland, and the Panama Canal, key defence policies include keeping America out of “unnecessary foreign wars”, restoring peace in Europe and the Middle East, getting rid of ‘woke’ radical-left ideology from the military, and building a state-of-the-art next-generation missile defense shield (an iron dome over the US).
Some are anxious that Trump is NATO-sceptic and would consider leaving the alliance because he believes the US pays too much relative to Europe, but he may be using this threat to get other allies to pay their fair share. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte does not seem too worried, arguing ahead of the election that “in a harsh, uncompromising world he needs the alliance”. Yet Trump has since called for European nations to spend 5 per cent of GDP on defence, a figure higher than the US’ own spending of 3.4 per cent of GDP. Poland supports this, showing that perhaps his strategy is already working.
As for current conflicts, securing an end to wars (and ensuring the ceasefire holds up in the case of Israel-Hamas) will be of paramount importance. Trump will take office off the back of this new ceasefire agreement and continue to push for the release of Israeli hostages in the Middle East, while the debate over support for Ukraine continues to divide the GOP in Congress, leaving Europe more isolated in its support. In keeping with his promotion of self-sufficiency, recently Trump floated the idea of asking Europe to reimburse the US$200bn for the cost of rebuilding US stockpiles sent to Ukraine. As robust partners of Ukraine and in order to maintain peace in the Middle East, the UK must continue to use its diplomatic tools to make the case to our US colleagues.
Competition with China will also be a clear focus for the next Administration. While this is consistent with the Biden Administration which regarded China as: “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective”, in its 2022 National Security Strategy, Trump seeks to go further, planning a targeted 60 per cent import tariff on Chinese goods to protect domestic industries. Close Trump advisers such as incoming Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and China hawk, Elbridge Colby, who led the 2018 National Defense Strategy, has signalled that he would advise reprioritising US capabilities towards China, pulling back from other support such as Ukraine while he expects Europe to step up to ensure their own security.
Multilateralism will also be tested. While many commentators liken the challenges of the current age to geopolitical flashpoints throughout the 20th century, 80 years on from the inception of the Bretton Woods Institutions, these organisations will be under increasing scrutiny to reform. In conceiving the “Special Relationship” between the UK and the US, Sir Winston Churchill also advocated for robust international institutions to uphold the values the Allies had defended. Instead today, Trump pledges to “reject globalism and embrace patriotism”. Will we see more MDB reform that includes the voices of a new world order as a result?
However World Bank President Ajay Banga seems to intend to align the Bank’s goals with US interests, and has defended Trump to an extent, citing the $13bn capital increase for the Bank that he supported when he was first in office. Banga says that Trump understands the World Bank’s ability to multiply development aid several times and that its lending can develop overseas markets for U.S. companies.
Closely linked to this is the international development agenda, which came under a particular spotlight through media coverage of the Heritage Foundation’s controversial policy document, Project 2025. Although speculation over who might be the next leader of USAID mentions Max Primorac who wrote the development section of Project 2025, their political capital has taken a hit after it was downplayed by Trump. David Beasley, the former head of the World Food Programme and a former Governor of South Carolina, is also rumoured to be in the running. He is optimistic about the potential for U.S. leadership on development and believes that it is in the domestic interest. Another name is Bill Steiger, who was USAID chief of staff under Administrator Mark Green and godson of former President George H. W. Bush. He is a strong advocate for changing how USAID spends its money. Similarly Jim Richardson, a close aide to Mike Pompeo who is best known for leading the largest-ever restructuring of USAID, is another potential leader. Yet it remains unclear who will take over from Administrator Samantha Power.
What we can expect however, is a culture of change, a more bilateral framework and value for money taking precedence. During the last Administration Trump pursued USAID reform, established the Development Finance Corporation to encourage private investments for emerging economies, attempted to roll back PEPFAR, the HIV/AIDS assistance programme spearheaded by President George W. Bush that has saved over 20 million lives, and attempted to leave the World Health Organisation (which he is pledging to do again).
So what does this foreign policy agenda mean for UK-US relations? The transatlantic relationship will remain intact regardless of who is President, but past disparaging comments about Trump from members of the front bench and the power of Elon Musk’s tweets are already shaping the tone and strength of that relationship. Controversy over Musk’s potential involvement with the Reform Party continues to grip politicos, but we must offer Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer a chance to demonstrate how he will navigate the relationship.
The future of the transatlantic relationship rests upon how we respond to geopolitical challenges, working in partnership with the new Administration. Personalities aside, the UK must be robust in its defence of security, prosperity and leadership, and remember the greater diplomatic rewards and historic nature of this relationship.
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