Strategic Defence and Security Review – Further misery for the Armed Forces or cause for optimism?

The second Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is due to be published just a few days before the spending review, on 23 November. The document will outline the key areas of defence spending and investment for the next five years and will likely focus on the key areas neglected by the 2010 iteration, namely maritime patrols and aerial surveillance.

The relevance of carrying such an exercise and producing an inflexible and unresponsive document  has been doubted by many, the 2010 SDSR preceded the ‘Arab Spring’ in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria by weeks and failed to address the potential for widespread unrest and violence across the Middle East and North Africa. More recently the Government has attracted criticism for allowing the Cabinet Office to lead the exercise rather than experts in the Ministry of Defence. Critics have also raised concerns around the five year planning window, as opposed to a longer timeframe, to help improve procurement practices.

The current threats the SDSR will have to address stability in Libya and Syria, the global threat of Islamic State, cyber-terrorism and Russian aggression, amongst many other issues and, perhaps most interesting of all, future unknown unknowns.

In a recent speech to RUSI, Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon praised the cross-departmental nature of the SDSR and dispelled myths it was going to be a simple cost-cutting exercise. Fallon indicated three key priorities for the document; a greater focus on international cooperation where appropriate “making the most of global partnerships”, improving the efficiency of the defence industry as a whole to get as much value for money from the two per cent of GDP spend, and a greater focus on technical innovation, specifically coming from small and medium sized businesses.

Writing for PoliticsHome, former Chief of the General Staff (2006-2009) Lord Dannatt called for seven key focusses for the 2015 SDSR; to settle once and for all the future of the UK’s nuclear capability, a commitment to adequate levels of conventional forces to compliment the nuclear deterrent, a credible defence industrial strategy to ensure that the equipment the Armed Forces need will be available without over-reliance on other countries, a plan to ensure that the quantum of aircraft, ships and ground units is such that they retain real utility, adequate resources for cyber threats, sufficient funding for training and an explicit recognition of the importance of soft power and integration of both hard and soft power into all diplomatic strategy.

Rumours abound on the possible contents of the strategy paper, a couple of which are examined below;

• Maritime patrol – The sight of Nimrod fuselages being scrapped and broken down was a bitter pill for many in government to swallow and inclusion in the 2015 strategy is expected, although at this point it is unclear whether a new capability will be developed(Boeing P-8 Poseidon an option), or a cooperation agreement with another NATO nation will be announced, or old transport aircraft will be re-purposed. A number of alternatives have been suggested, including the Kawasaki P-1.
• Manpower – The 2015 exercise heralded a major shift in how the armed forces functioned, with Future Force 2020 swinging into operation. Further cuts to manpower are rumoured, although The Sun reportedthe Royal Navy could see an increase in 2,500 sailors, a potentially embarrassing government U-turn. A more conservative estimateputs the increase at just 300.
• Defence estate – As part of Whitehall efforts to save money Government buildings and real estate have been sold, and the defence estate will not be immune to that. A number of Navy bases are under threat of closure.
• Marines – The fate of the Royal Marines is facing scrutiny, reports suggest it could be merged into the Armyor with the Parachute Regiment.
• Naval presence – The role of Britain’s warships in Libya, Somalia, Yemen and the Mediterranean has become a media focus, and some want to seefurther investment in the Type 26 programme.
• Jet power – The SDSR could confirmfuture procurement plans for F-35 capability, the UK currently has just ten on order and has previously committed to purchasing 138.
• Intelligence and surveillance – Prime Minister David Cameron announced in Octoberthe intention to double the current RAF Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) fleet as well as an upgrade in Special Forces’ equipment. The SDSR will likely confirm the decision to replace the existing fleet of 10 Reaper aircraft with more than 20 of the latest generation of RPAS, which will be called Protector and will carry the very latest technology.
• Chinook and helicopter capability – Long procurement and development chains mean that many of the Chinook helicopters, needed during combat in Afghanistan, are only now coming into service. The UK is on course to have the largest Chinook fleet in Europeand the helicopters have played in increasing rolein humanitarian work. Given the history of investment, a new announcement on the programme is unlikely, although a programme of modifications could be one policy included.
   

In conclusion, the future capabilities could well be dictated by what is affordable rather than what is needed or desired. The Government will argue cuts are needed to balance the books and ensure that bigger spending projects can be supported by 2020. However, the speed and spread of the Arab Spring in 2010, demonstrated how, in just a few quick weeks, the SDSR could be rendered obsolete and Britain left in the cold on the international stage.